Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Tinbergen Institute
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for economic Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl.
Introduction
It is well-known that in an in…nitely-repeated oligopoly model, almost all prices, including the monopoly price, can be sustained by trigger strategy pro…les as cartel prices for su¢ ciently patient …rms. Since the monopoly price leads to the highest deadweight loss in social welfare, the e¤ects of antitrust enforcement are often con…ned to the question whether enforcement deters monopoly pricing, see e.g. Block et al. (1981) and Harrington (2005) . Antitrust enforcement in practice is regarded as too weak to deter monopoly pricing. We investigate and reexamine the latter conclusion by presenting a simple model where the pro…t-maximizing cartel price converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the …rms become su¢ ciently patient. Because of its important policy implications for antitrust enforcement, we investigate conditions for such a convergence result in a general in…nitely-repeated oligopoly model.
The model studied here is a repeated-game version of the dynamic model in Harrington (2004, 2005) , who extensively motivates most of the assumptions adopted in our model.
In particular, …nes (including other liabilities) and detection probabilities depend upon the current and past prices, which makes Harrington's model a dynamic game. In a steady state, however, the equilibrium analysis in any period will only depend on the cartel price in the current period. For explanatory reasons, we assume that detection probabilities and …nes depend upon the current price only.
One crucial feature in our model is that the cartel may reestablish after it is detected and prosecuted. Our approach uni…es two extreme treatments in the literature. On one extreme, Harrington (2004 Harrington ( , 2005 assumes that a cartel dissolves after it is caught and …ned. On other extreme, Motta and Polo (2003) investigate notorious cartels, that will reestablish no matter how many times it has been convicted. Here we assume that a cartel will reestablish probabilistically in every period in which it is detected and …ned.
This note makes several contributions. First, the presence of probabilistic reestablishment of the cartel requires di¤erent equilibrium conditions on sustainable cartel prices. In Section 2, we set up such a model with probabilistic reestablishment of the cartel and provide the corresponding equilibrium conditions. Section 3 is devoted to a linear Bertrand oligopoly model with linear detection probabilities. The …ne is proportional to the …rms'illegal gains, as suggested by the current US sentencing guidelines. We show that the pro…t-maximizing cartel price converges to the competitive Bertrand equilibrium price as the discount factor goes to one. In Section 4, we establish a set of necessary conditions for such a seemingly counter-intuitive result in a general setup and provide intuition for this convergence.
The Model
Consider an in…nitely-repeated oligopoly model in the presence of antitrust enforcement.
In each period, …rms compete in prices and the antitrust authority (AA) investigates the market. If the …rms collude, they will be caught and …ned with certain probability. Both the probability of detection and the …ne depend on how serious the anti-trust violation is in the current period.
Price competition in every period is modelled as a symmetric Bertrand game among n 2 …rms. 
To further simplify the exposition, we normalize the model such that (p N ) = 0 and interpret (p) as the net pro…t above p N .
As motivated by Harrington (2004 Harrington ( , 2005 , the detection probability depends upon the cartel's price setting and this re ‡ects that a higher cartel price might raise more suspicions about cartel abuse and, therefore, makes detection (and conviction) more likely. If …rms collude at price p > p N , they will be detected with probability (p) 
There are two di¤erent treatments in the literature of how …rms behave after each conviction. In Harrington (2004 Harrington ( , 2005 , being caught once is su¢ cient to deter cartel activity in the future. In Motta and Polo (2003) , the economic sector is notorious for cartel activities despite many convictions. To unify these two di¤erent treatments, let 2 [0; 1] be the probability that the …rms stop illegal activities after each conviction. = 0 implies that cartel is notorious implies, while = 1 means the sector becomes competitive after the …rst conviction of a cartel.
In the repeated game, every …rm has a common discount factor 2 (0; 1) per period.
It is well-known that an in…nitely-repeated game, such as the model studied in this paper, generally admits multiple equilibrium outcomes when the discount factor is su¢ ciently close to one. We are interested in subgame perfect equilibria with the following modi…ed trigger strategy pro…le to sustain a cartel price of p > p N : Firms collude at price p > p N in the …rst period and continue to collude at price p as long as no …rm deviates in setting this price.
Any price deviation by any …rm leads to perpetual competition at price p N . Cartel will be detected with probability (p), after which the …rms continue to collude with probability 1 in the following period and switch to perfect competition with probability forever. Under such a strategy pro…le, the present value of a …rm's expected pro…t V (p; ) is determined recursively by
which yields
Assuming that any price-deviating …rm will not be …ned, the equilibrium condition becomes and other parameters. The pro…t-maximizing cartel price is then
A Linear Bertrand Model
In this section, we show that the pro…t-maximizing cartel price can converge to the competitive equilibrium price as the discount factor goes to one. Consider a homogeneous Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand 2 p and constant marginal costs of 0. Then, we have
The antitrust regulation is given by (p) = p with > 0, and f (p) = k (p), where the …ne function re ‡ects the current practice in the US (see Harrington 2004 Harrington , 2005 . Note that
Recall that p can be sustained as a cartel price by our modi…ed grim trigger strategy pro…le if and only if V (p; ) opt (p), which holds as long as [ (k + n )] p < 1. Note that this condition is independent of the discount factor . This condition ensures that any p that is su¢ ciently close to the competitive price p N = 0 can be sustained as a cartel price for su¢ ciently large discount factors. This fact con…rms the assertion of Harrington (2004 Harrington ( , 2005 ) that the equilibrium conditions are always non-binding for su¢ ciently large < 1.
2 Our analysis is still valid if a price-deviating …rm is …ned when the cartel is detected.
With our modi…ed trigger strategy pro…le, a …rm's value function is given by
Observe that V (p; ) is log concave in p 2 (0; 1] because
Because any price that is su¢ ciently close to the competitive price can be supported as a cartel price, and as we will show, the pro…t-maximizing cartel price converges to the competitive price, the constraint in (2) becomes nonbinding for su¢ ciently large . Consequently, for su¢ ciently large , p C ( ) is characterized by @V (p; ) =@p = 0, that is,
Denote lim !1 p C ( ) =p. Taking the limit of (4) as ! 1, and given > 0, we have
Obviously,p = 1 + 1 2k
> p
M cannot be the limit of pro…t-maximizing cartel price. Hence,
which is the main message of this paper.
To conclude this section, we demonstrate that the pro…t-maximizing cartel price p C ( ) is nonmonotonic in . When the equilibrium condition in (2) is binding,
which monotonically nondecreases in the discount factor 2 (0; 1). When the equilibrium condition in (2) is nonbinding, then p C ( ) is the solution to (4) in [0; 1]. Generally speaking,
we cannot obtain the analytical solutions to (4). However, when k = 1=2, (4) simpli…es to
2 ;
The pro…t-maximizing cartel price p C ( ).
which decreases in 2 (0; 1) and converges to the competitive equilibrium price p N = 0 as goes to 1. Figure 1 illustrates that the pro…t-maximizing cartel price is nonmonotonic with respect to the discount factor . When is small enough, only the competitive price can be the equilibrium price. On the other hand, when the discount factor is su¢ ciently close to 1, the equilibrium condition is nonbinding so (4) characterizes the pro…t-maximizing cartel price (which decreases in ). For an intermediate range of discount factors, the pro…t-maximizing cartel price is determined by the equilibrium condition, and increases in . It is worthwhile to note that as the discount factor increases, the set of equilibrium prices grows, yet the pro…t-maximizing cartel price decreases to the competitive price eventually.
Conditions for Convergence
To establish our convergence result, we …rst need to make sure whether all p that are suf…ciently close to the competitive price can be supported by the modi…ed trigger strategy pro…les described in Section 2 for su¢ ciently large 2 (0; 1).
Proposition 1 If there exists
then any p 2 [p N ; p N + ") can be sustained in equilibrium for all 2 [ 0 ; 1) for some 0 < 1.
Proof. Observe that p = p N can always be sustained in equilibrium for all 2 (0; 1).
continuous in , there exists some 0 < 1 such that for all 2 [ 0 ; 1),
which means that p 2 [p N ; p N + ") can be sustained in equilibrium for all 2 [ 0 ; 1). (5) Proposition 2 Under (5) and 
where the …rst term on the left-hand side and the last two terms on the right-hand side 
